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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the paper is to examine the economic impact of China on the 
Southeast Asian countries, mainly in terms of trade and investment. The 
paper attempts to examine whether the rise of China poses a threat to 
Southeast Asia as a region in the area of international trade, especially 
competition in the third markets. Can they be comrades rather than 
competitors in international market? Secondly, the paper also questions the 
concentration of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China implies a diversion of 
FDI away from the region. Are the FDI in China and Southeast Asian region 
complement each other in the international division of labour? On the other 
hand, the increasing role of China as an international trader and global 
investor provides an opportunity for Southeast Asia countries to integrate with 
the Chinese economy. The huge domestic market of China also provides vast 
opportunities for investment, especially through connections of their 
respective ethnic Chinese businesses in the region. In return, Southeast 
Asian countries, through their respective ethnic groups can also play a 
middleman role between China and the West, as well as between China and 
India together with the Middle East. 
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Introduction 
 
The sudden emergence of China as an economic powerhouse has 
caused a stir in the international political and economic arena since early 
2000s. A number of countries express awful fear of the emergence while 
others greet with much admiration. Those who are fearful of the rise express 
their concern that cheap labour cost in China will inevitably wipe out their 
industries and reduce their market shares in the international market. Those 
who welcome its rise emphasize China’s sheer size of domestic market as 
ample opportunities for their exploitation and its potential role as another 
engine of economic growth in the region after Japan. 
 
Since the opening of China in 1978, China achieved a spectacular and 
unprecedented economic growth in the economic history of mankind. On 
average, real GDP growth recorded 9.7% over the span between 1979 and 
2005, as compared with a growth of 5.3% between 1949 and 1977. Per capita 
income also grew strongly from US$205 in 1980 to US$1,100 in 2005. 
According to the announcement made on 20 December 2005, its GDP 
estimates had been revised upward by 16.8% on average such that China 
now replaces Britain and ranks the fourth largest economy in the world. If 
GDP is measured based on purchasing power parity (PPP), then China ranks 
second after the United States. 
 
At the micro level, China is the largest producer in the world in steel, 
cement, coal, mobile phones, digital cameras, colour televisions, DVD players, 
and pharmaceutical ingredients (Hanscomb Means Report, Jul./Aug. 2004). It 
ranks second in the production in electricity and third in semiconductor chips. 
As a consumer, China is the largest purchaser of steel, cement, copper, tin, 
platinum, zinc, coal, ‘fine’ chemicals and mobile phones. It ranks second in 
the consumption of oil, aluminum, lead and electricity. All these statistics 
indicates that China is an important producer and also a large consumer, a 
fact that Southeast Asia cannot afford to ignore. 
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Some economists consider the economic rise of China as an 
“economic miracle.” It took four centuries for Europe to achieve the current 
level that China has achieved. The United States, on the other hand, took 
almost a century to reach the same level. However, China took only a few 
decades to achieve just that. The basic strengths of such “miracle” lies in its 
endowment of relatively cheap and quality labour (cost reduction), huge size 
of its domestic market (market access), good infrastructures (access to 
immobile inputs) and preferential tax treatments for foreign investment (policy 
environment). The economic growth has been sustainable because, firstly it 
has many growth drivers (Anderson, 2005). Secondly, these drivers emerge 
sequentially one after another rather than appear all at the same time. In 
addition, each driver normally sustains for a long period.   
 
The rise of China has exerted a great impact on the world economy. 
First of all, China has emerged as an important trading nation. It ranks as the 
third largest leading exporter and importer in the world after European Union 
(EU) and the United States. If EU is not treated as an integrated economy and 
thereby excluded, then China ranks second as a leading exporter and 
importer. With its strong presence in international trade, China has been 
enjoying current account surplus since late 1970s. At the same time, it also 
attracts massive volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) amounting to 
US$60 billion in 2004, overtaking the United States as the largest destination 
of FDI since 2002. Both current account surplus and capital inflows over the 
past decades had contributed to its large pool of external reserves. At end of 
February 2006, external reserves of China recorded US$853.7 billion, 
overtaking Japan (US$850.1 billion) as the world’s largest holder of foreign 
exchange reserves (Bradsher, 29 March 2006) . Thus, it has been recognized 
that with its sheer size of China’s economy and its rapid expansion, China 
begins to serve as an engine of growth not only in Asia, but even globally 
(Lardy, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, China’ economy is just one-seventh the size of the 
United States economy and only one third the size of Japan. Secondly, it will 
take another 45 years until 2050 before it can be called a modernized, 
medium-level developed country. Moreover, China has a long way to go in its 
economic reforms, especially the reforms of its financial sector and state-
owned enterprises. Other weaknesses of the Chinese economy include 
disparities between rural and urban, regional disparity between coastal 
provinces and provinces in other parts of China, and the insurmountable 
problems of the agricultural sector, rural villages and poor farmers (locally 
known as problems of “san nong”). Of no less importance are environmental 
deterioration, social security issues, fragmented markets, corruption and 
generally poor governance in corporate and banking sector. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze any possible threats and 
opportunities posed by the economic rise of China on trade and investment in 
Southeast Asia. The paper is divided into five sections. After the Introduction, 
the next section attempts to examine the controversial issue on the diversion 
of FDI away from Southeast Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
China has been accused as the culprit for sucking away most of FDI at the 
expense of the region. A number of studies has shown that there is a co-
movement between FDI in China and that of Southeast Asia probably arising 
from the emergence of the Asian production networks with vertical 
fragmentation of supply chain. The third section tries to answer another 
controversial issue that the China with its cheap labour cost might have wide 
out Southeast Asian tigers in international trade, especially after China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Notwithstanding the 
accusation of China posing a threat in trade and investment, China with its 
large domestic market and huge external reserves provides windows of 
opportunities to Southeast Asia for further exploitation. The concluding section 
attempts to raise other related issues and concerns from the perspective of 
Southeast Asia. 
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How Serious Is the Giant Sucking Sound? 
 
China has been attracting a huge amount of FDI since early 1990s. 
Southeast Asian economy was in economic boom then and the phenomenal 
growth of FDI in China went unnoticed. However, with the outbreak of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, Southeast Asia began to feel the pinch that 
FDI was diverting away from the region and invested in China (See Table 1). 
To make matter worse, some foot-loose industries were also moving upward 
north, presumably taking advantage of cheap and quality labour there. The 
share of FDI also showed a significant decline for Southeast Asia vis-à-vis 
that of China. In the early 1990s, ASEAN accounted for about 30% of FDI 
flowing to developing Asia, while China’s accounted for only18% (Yang, 2003). 
About one decade later, ASEAN’s share had fallen to only 10% in 2000, while 
that of China had increased to 30%. It is therefore not surprising that when 
Malaysia’s FDI inflow fell in 2002, the then Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir 
remarked, ”Everyone is feeling the pinch because of the amount of FDIs has 
shrunk and then, a lot of that is going to China…” (Straits Times, 21, 
September 2002). Panitchpakdi (2000) also expressed the same feeling and 
has this to say, “We seem to be suffering somewhat from the diversion of 
investment away from ASEAN [towards China].” All these lead to the fear of 
“the giant sucking sound” (Fung and others, 2005) not only in terms of 
withdrawal of existing FDI to China (“hollowing-out” effect) but also the receipt 
of new FDI. 
 
Table 1 FDI inflow of China and ASEAN-5 in past 11 years, US$ billion 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China 27.5 33.7 35.8 40.1 44.2 43.7 38.7 38.3 44.2 49.3 53.5 
Indonesia 2.0 2.1 4.3 6.1 4.6 -0.3 -2.7 -4.5 -3.2 -1.5 -0.5 
Malaysia 5.0 4.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 2.1 3.8 3.7 0.5 3.2 2.4 
Philippines 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.7 0.3 
Singapore 4.6 8.5 11.5 9.3 13.5 7.5 13.2 12.4 10.9 7.6 5.5 
Thailand 1.8 1.3 2.0 2.3 3.8 7.3 6.1 3.3 3.8 0.9 1.9 
            
ASEAN-5 14.7 17.9 23.5 24.4 28.4 19.0 22.2 16.4 13.1 12.0 96.7 
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China and  
ASEAN-5 Total 42.2 51.7 59.4 64.6 72.7 62.7 60.9 54.8 57.3 61.3 63.1 
ASEAN-5/Total 35 35 40 38 39 30 36 30 23 20 15 
China/ Total 65 65 60 62 61 70 64 70 77 80 85 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, 2005.  
 
The impression of “the giant sucking sound” is understandable. This 
was especially noticeable immediately after the Asian Financial Crisis. There 
were severe capital flights during the crisis arising from macroeconomic 
vulnerability and political uncertainty in the region. For instance, racial riots in 
Indonesia in the aftermath had caused a loss of confidence among ethnic 
Chinese business, be it indigenous or foreign to move away from Indonesia.  
There were also changes in political regimes and heads of central banks and 
monetary authorities in the region, causing more uncertainty in economic 
policies. Even with a V-shape economic recovery within a short span of time 
after the crisis, it did not help much as damage had been done. Secondly, “the 
hollowing-out’ effect arising from the prominence of China as a cheaper place 
for investment became too obvious by then. This was further evidenced by a 
significant shrinking of Southeast Asia’s share of FDI vis-à-vis that of China, 
especially after its accession to WTO in 2001. 
 
China as a Magnet for Investment  
 
From the multinational corporations’ (MNCs) perspective, investment 
decision, besides political stability and conducive business environment, 
depends critically on market access for their products and services, 
comparative cost of business and production and access to immobile inputs. 
China, from many respects fits nicely in this framework and has been 
attracting FDI which are “market orientated, cost orientated and input 
orientated” (Buckley, 2004). Following Buckley’s analysis, China is a magnet 
for FDI because of the following factors: 
• Large domestic market (market access) 
• Cheap and skilled labour (cost reduction, access to immobile inputs) 
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• Fixed exchange rate (risk reduction) 
• Investment incentives (cost reduction) 
• Good infrastructures (access to immobile inputs) 
 
FDI from “Western” MNCs (including those from Japan) in China are 
often aimed at penetrating host country’s market, thus evading import barriers 
and licensing imposed on their exports to China. This is in contrast to FDI 
from the newly industrial economies (NIEs) such as Korea, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong which are more concerned with cost reduction, especially labour cost. In 
the early phase of FDI flows since 1978, most of the FDI to China came 
mainly from newly industrialized economies (NIEs) such as Korea, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. These investments were exported-oriented (Cross and Tan, 
2004). Instead of producing and exporting from home bases, these FDI used 
China as an export platform for exporting their manufactured products to the 
United States, European Union and Japan. As a result, their production bases 
concentrated at coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai and 
Jiangsu. With rapid development in computer and telecommunication 
technology, vertical fragmentation of production process and supply chain 
across borders based on each country’s or region’s comparative advantage 
have displaced the importance of agglomeration economies as a key in global 
strategy of MNCs. FDI from NIEs exploit thus fully these comparative 
advantages by integrating China as part of their vertical supply chain. 
Consequently, those labour-intensive processing and assembling operations 
were relocated from their homelands or Southeast Asia to China’s coastal 
provinces. The flows of this type of FDI into China accelerated in late 1990s 
and early 2000s when political and economic uncertainty in the region 
became more prevalent. 
 
Southeast Asia is no lack of cheap labour. Countries like Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Myanmar are excellent examples. Their failures to 
attract this type of FDI indicate that factors other than cheap labour do matter 
to the Asian MNCs. Some attribute to cultural affinity and ‘guangxi’ between 
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ethnic Chinese businesses in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and 
mainland Chinese in China as one significant determinant in their investment 
decision. According to Crawford (2000),  
 
“Ethnic Chinese firms and their unique social capital are at the 
centre of the business networks that define coastal China’s 
political economy and its intensified integration with the global 
economy. FDI and trade flows to and from the Southern 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and to overseas Chinese 
communities, constitute major sources of synergy between the 
economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China. Each plays a 
complementary role in ‘Greater China’ and are connected via a 
series of private socioeconomic linkages that transcend political 
boundaries…” 
 
To validate the existence of such cultural factor, Gao (August 2001) 
conducted an empirical study on the determinants of FDI in China and 
included share of ethnic Chinese population in each of the source country as 
a proxy for the cultural factor. The estimation results of various equations 
show positive relationships with 95% confidence level. He therefore concludes 
that “a one percentage point increase in the ethnic Chinese population share 
leads to a 3.8% or higher increase in cumulative FDI in China.” This 
conclusion is totally absurd and the positive relationships may be considered 
as spurious. Firstly, using share of ethnic Chinese population as a proxy for 
cultural factor is misleading. It implies that the larger the share the more 
cultural it is. Singapore has the largest share of ethnic Chinese population 
among Southeast Asian nations and yet its business culture is the most 
westernized and has least use of cultural affinity and ‘guanxi’ in business 
dealings (Chan and Ng, 2000; 2001). Secondly, share of Chinese population 
and accumulative stock of FDI have theoretically no causal relationships and, 
more important still, both are somewhat influenced by time trend. The positive 
relationships in Gao’s study are therefore spurious. 
 
Apart from cheap and quality labour, political stability, liberal economic 
policy, and market access as exemplified by China since its opening in 1978 
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are more important factors in determining FDI flows to China. Cultural factors, 
perhaps, are of secondary importance or least importance. 
 
FDI Diversion and Round-tripping 
 
China has been the largest recipient of FDI since 2002. Of the 
investors, Hong Kong has by far been the largest investor in China since 1978, 
accounting for about 45% of the total FDI. However, it has been estimated 
that a significant portion of these FDI from Hong Kong is actually originated 
from China itself. World Bank (2002) estimated that such type of the “round 
tripping” of funds accounts for 20% to 30% of FDI in China. Xiao (2004) finds 
that the “round tripping’ has been underestimated and the figure may be as 
high as 40% of the total FDI in China. Gunter (2004) estimates that about one 
quarter of flight capital later returns to China when opportunities arise. These 
capital flights are normally channeled through under –invoicing for exports 
and over-invoicing for imports. The main motive of such “round tripping” is to 
evade or avoid trade barriers or gain access to investment incentives 
available only to foreign investors (for instance,15% corporate tax for foreign 
investors vis-à-vis 33% for domestic firms), and also better investor protection 
offered in China to foreign investors (Chantasasawat and others, Nov. 2004; 
Erskine, Aug. 2004).  
 
Another motive for the “round-tripping” through offshore financial 
centres such as Virgin Island and Western Samoa is to evade taxes from 
source countries (Prasad and Wei, 2005). Most of these investors came from 
Japan, Taiwan and the United States. Consequently, Virgin Islands for no 
reason accounted for slightly about 10% of the total FDI flows to China since 
1998 while the share of Western Samoa rose from 0.3% in 1998 to 2% in 
2004. The above two types of “round-tripping” tend to overstate the FDI flows 
to China and at the same time give rise to the impression that China has been 
sucking away investment from Southeast Asian region. 
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Another type of “round-tripping” was due to the earlier prohibition of 
Taiwanese investment in mainland China by the Taiwanese authorities 
(Prasad and Wei, 2005; Mercereau, 2005). To evade such restrictions, 
significant portions of the Taiwanese investment flowed through Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Virgin Islands and Western Samoa and were then re-directed to 
China eventually. When these restrictions were progressively removed, there 
was a significant diversion of these investments from Southeast Asia, notably 
Singapore towards China directly. Mercereau (2005) attributes this factor in 
his empirical study for the inverse relationships between FDI in China and FDI 
in Singapore. Therefore, Singapore’s decline in FDI does not imply a diversion 
of new FDI away from the island country toward China. This is especially so 
because the two countries’ basically attract different types of FDI; one 
concentrates on labour-intensive and market access type of FDI while the 
other prefers export-oriented high-tech investment.  
 
FDI Augmenting in Export-oriented Industries 
 
Cross and Tan (2004) categorize FDI into three types and assess the 
impact of China in attracting FDI on Southeast Asia. According to them, for 
countries like Brunei, Myanmar and Indonesia, FDI are mostly natural 
resource-oriented, notably in oil and gas extraction and support industries, 
China is not a threat. If China attracts huge amount of market seeking FDI, 
countries like Brunei, Lao and Singapore will be adversely affected because 
of small population; Myanmar and Vietnam will be affected because of lack of 
purchasing power. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines may not be affected 
much depending on whether FDI are of capital or technology-intensive. FDI 
stock of Southeast Asia used to exhibit strong source country affiliation. For 
instance Malaysia tends to attract British-owned FDI while American-owned 
FDI tend to flow to the Philippines and Thailand. If China is able to attract 
more FDI from these countries, there will be a diversion of FDI away from 
Southeast Asia, not to mention effect of ‘hollowing-out’ and offshore 
outsourcing and outprocessing.  
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Singapore will benefit by investing in China with their expertise in 
service-related areas, such as transport and logistics. Countries such as 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam will be adversely affected. Malaysia 
and Indonesia which are the two traditional Singapore FDI are somewhat 
affected 
 
Anderson (2004) argues that FDI to developing countries is not a zero 
sum game. Firstly, resource-seeking FDI, especially those of oil and gas 
extraction may not come to China as noted by Cross and Tan (2004). 
Secondly, most of the FDI going to China are of market seeking type (about 
75%) with the rest meant for export-oriented. Even if the FDI are of export-
oriented category, China may not crowd out this type of FDI from Southeast 
Asian countries. On the contrary, the increase in FDI in China may also 
encourage additional FDI in other countries. For instance, to reap the full 
benefits of building assembly plants in China, MNCs may also need to invest 
components production in Singapore and Malaysia. With the advancement of 
computer and telecommunication technology, supply chain can be fragmented 
vertically such that comparative advantage of each host country can be 
exploited optimally. Since each country is endowed with different comparative 
advantage, MNCs will allocate the type of sub-component of the supply chain 
most suitable to that particular country. For instance, the labour intensive 
assembly and operations will be allocated to China as its labour force is 
cheap and also comparatively efficient (compared to Indonesia and Myanmar). 
As for those require higher level of skills or more capital intensive, MNCs will 
allocate this type of plants to those countries which have such comparative 
advantage. In this case countries like Singapore and Malaysia fit well into the 
integrated Asian production system.  
 
Such international division of labour in Asia has resulted in high volume 
of intra-firm and intra-industry trade in the region. In the transition, it is 
observed that there was a speeding up of withdrawal of the most advanced 
Asian economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) from the 
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production and exports of labour intensive products and enlarging of intra-
regional trade in sophisticated intermediate components and manufactured 
goods. In this sense, China serves as an export platform while the other 
Southeast Asian countries specialize in more sophisticated production 
process. As Zebregs (2004: 12) observes,  
 
The reorganization of production process across borders has 
contributed to more intraregional trade and FDI as well as a 
growing share of Chinese exports in international markets. It 
has also resulted in a high correlation of 0.8 of intraregional 
exports to China and China’s exports to the EU, Japan, and the 
United States over the past ten years. 
 
In analyzing the impact of China on Southeast Asia in attracting FDI, 
Mercereau (2005) uses data for 14 countries spanning the period 1984-2002. 
His paper does not find much evidence that China’s success in attracting FDI 
has been at the expense of other countries in the region, with the exception of 
Singapore and Myanmar. Singapore was affected because of the lifting of 
investment restrictions on China by Taiwanese authorities. Previously, 
Taiwanese investors tried to circumvent such restrictions by investing in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. After the lifting, total Taiwanese FDI to China increases, 
while Taiwanese FDI to Singapore decreases. In the case of Myanmar, 
Singapore which was previously the second largest investor in Myanmar now 
turns to China and HK and thereby reduces its flows to Myanmar. However, 
majority of Southeast Asian countries were not much affected. 
 
Moreover, Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2004) find that 
China’s FDI receipts and other Asian countries’ receipts are positively 
correlated. This evidence together with an increasing intraregional trade 
confirms the every existence of an integrated production system in Asia based 
on international division of labour. In the same vein, Eichengreen and Tong 
(2005) also report that the increasing amount of FDI flowing into China 
simultaneously induces greater investment in other countries. To the extent 
that they are part of the same interconnected global production network, the 
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authors find that this complementary relationship is particularly evident in Asia, 
where China's economic expansion provides impetus to foreign investors “to 
support a regional supply chain for feeding China's burgeoning and varied 
enterprises.” 
 
Does the Dragon Wipe Out Tigers in International Trade? 
 
It has been a concern to Southeast Asian nations that with the 
emergence of China as the third largest trading nation after the United States 
(US) and European Union (EU), China has posed a serious threat to these 
countries (see Table 2). First of all, China with its cheap labour competes 
directly with Southeast Asian countries in the world market for manufactures, 
especially light manufacturing and labour intensive products, and increasingly 
higher value added products, such as semi-conductors, and other technology 
products. Secondly, effective from January 2005, the United States and EU 
had abolished their quotas on Chinese textiles, garments and apparels 
exports under WTO rules. Hence, China will become a formidable competitor 
in these two markets as textiles, garments and apparels are labour-intensive 
products. This “trade competition” paradigm is well supported by empirical 
evidence conducted by Bhattacharya A. S. Ghosh and W. J. Jansen (2001). 
They conclude that “…, our findings constitute some preliminary support for 
the view that China’s rapid export growth has hurt some Asian economies in 
their core export markets since 1994, notably Malaysia, Pakistan and 
Thailand.” (2001:221) Kit, Ong and Kwan (2005) using a dynamic shift-share 
analysis also came to a conclusion that all the East Asian 7 economies (EA-7) 
of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand suffered negative net shifts as China turns into a manufacturing 
powerhouse. China has become a major competitor in exports of consumer 
goods but also in low and mid-range capital and intermediate goods. 
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Table 2:  US Imports from ASEAN-5 and China in Billions of US dollars 
 World 
Total of 
US 
Indone-
sia 
Malaysia Philippines Singa-
pore 
Thailand ASEAN-5 China 
1987 424.4 4.0 3.1 2.5 7.3 2.3 19.2 3.1 
1988 459.5 3.6 3.7 2.6 9.5 3.3 22.7 3.5 
1989 492.9 4.3 4.9 3.3 10.7 4.5 27.7 4.7 
1990 517.0 4.2 5.2 3.3 11.7 5.5 29.7 5.8 
1991 508.4 4.2 6.0 3.3 11.9 6.3 31.7 6.8 
1992 553.9 5.3 7.9 4.0 13.6 7.6 38.5 9.6 
1993 603.4 6.1 10.2 4.6 15.1 8.3 44.3 18.4 
1994 689.2 6.7 12.7 5.3 17.6 9.6 51.8 22.5 
1995 770.9 7.5 15.7 6.4 21.2 10.3 61.0 26.0 
1996 822.0 8.1 14.9 7.4 23.2 10.4 63.9 28.9 
1997 899.0 8.5 15.2 9.2 23.1 11.8 67.8 35.4 
1998 944.4 8.5 16.4 10.3 22.0 14.0 71.2 41.2 
1999 1059.4 8.6 19.2 11.1 22.6 13.5 75.0 47.4 
2000 1259.3 9.4 22.8 12.5 23.6 15.5 83.8 62.3 
2001 1180.1 7.7 17.8 8.9 18.7 13.2 47.8 54.3 
2002 1202.3 7.5 18.8 8.6 19.1 13.5 48.6 70.0 
2003 1305.1 7.3 20.5 7.2 20.5 13.6 48.8 92.6 
2004 1525.3 10.5 23.7 8.1 23.5 15.5 57.9 139.7 
Source: 1. Asian Development Bank, 2005 for ASEAN and China.  
  2. http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ for United States imports total.  
 
Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004) also concur that China’s exports 
to third markets tend to crowd out the exports of other Asian countries. 
However, they make a distinction between consumer goods and capital goods. 
For consumer goods which are produced mainly by less-developed Asian 
countries, the crowding out effect is more serious. The effect on capital goods 
which are exports of developed Asian countries is much less. A rise in 
Chinese output therefore positively affects the exports of its high-income 
Asian neighbours but negatively affects the exports of less developed 
countries in the region. Lall and Albaladejo (2004) analyze the competitive 
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effects of China’s exports in terms of different levels of technology. For the 
NIEs and  ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) have 
been affected by China’s expansion into low technology products. The 
competitive effect is not a loss of market share but rather a lower gain in 
market share in the third market. This constitutes the main threats to the 
ASEAN-4 which is technologically less advanced. China’s threat in medium-
technology products is also growing. It is a matter of time that China would 
mount a serious competitive challenge to all Asian countries in products like 
automobiles, machinery and simple electronics. However, in high technology 
products, complementarity between China and its Asian neighbours is more 
pervasive.  
 
Study by Ahearne and others (2003) gives a different picture. They 
observe that there was a co-movement of export growth between China and 
other Asian economies in the period between 1979 and 2001. This suggests 
that common factors such as growth in advance economies, particularly 
United States, EU and Japan, movements in the world prices of key exports 
and movements in the yen-dollar exchange rates exerted far more impact on 
all Asian exports. Competition from China has negligible effects. Of no less 
importance is the vertical integration of many products in Asia also which 
contributes significantly to such co-movement. The evidence suggest a ‘flying 
geese’ trade pattern in which China and ASEAN-4 move into the product 
space vacated by NIEs. Kwan (2002) notes that the trade structures among 
the Asian nations are broadly consistent with their respective levels of 
economic development. The ‘flying-geese’ formation has not been disrupted 
by the emergence of China. 
 
In the same spirit, Joseph (2006) also observes a distinct division of 
labour in Asia and the tendencies for regional integration evidenced by a 
rising intra-Asian trade. In this instance, China is playing an increasingly 
important role in the so-called Asian production networks (Gaulier and others, 
2004) that produce for the world market. MNCs from Japan, South Korea, 
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Taiwan and Hong Kong invest heavily in China in the form of joint ventures 
which serve as manufacturing or processing arms of the MNCs. The joint-
venture companies import primary products or intermediate inputs from the 
East Asian countries for further processing and final assembly in China. The 
end products are then exported to the United States, Europe and Japan. This 
‘triangular trade’ has resulted in three consequences. Firstly, China is having 
huge trade deficits in its bilateral trade with its Northeast Asian neighbours 
while turning in large trade surpluses with the United States and Europe. For 
Southeast Asia, China’s trade surpluses with these countries are becoming 
smaller (Table 3) Secondly, trade between Japan and South Korea on the one 
hand and the United States and Europe on the other have been flat for many 
years (Joseph, 2006:27). Finally, China has been integrated with the Asian 
economy and in fact it is now an engine of economic growth in East Asia. 
 
Table 3:  ASEAN’s Trade with China, 1995-2004, US$, million 
Country / Item 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1995-
2004, 
avera
ge % 
Indonesia            
   Exports 1741 2057 2229 1832 2008 2767 2200 2903 3802 5870 14.5 
   Imports 1495 1597 1518 906 1242 2022 1842 2427 2957 5693 16.0 
Malaysia            
   Exports 1889 1882 1852 1994 2318 3028 3821 5253 6810 8460 18.1 
   Imports 1709 1876 2232 1849 2139 3237 3804 6157 7300 10339 22.1 
Philippines            
   Exports 209 328 244 344 575 663 793 1356 2145 5342 43.3 
   Imports 660 653 972 1199 1040 786 975 1252 1798 3539 20.5 
Singapore            
   Exports 2759 3395 4053 4065 3920 5377 5329 6863 10134 15392 21.0 
   Imports 4042 4439 5668 4851 5697 7116 7195 8869 11073 16211 16.7 
Thailand            
   Exports 1642 1868 1744 1769 1861 2806 2863 3553 5707 7103 17.6 
   Imports 2096 1953 2260 1822 2495 3377 3711 4928 6067 8185 16.3 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, 2005. 
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The above literature survey shows conflicting conclusions; one group 
reveals severe trade competition between China and its neighbours while the 
other observes a ‘flying-geese’ pattern in a ‘triangular trade’ in which China 
plays a pivotal role. Empirical evidence from studies by the first group (trade 
competition paradigm) has the result that China is a competitor rather than a 
comrade. This is because most of these studies apply various forms of market 
share analysis or correlation analysis. The first type of the analyses suffers 
from the implicit assumption of a zero-sum game. In particular, a loss of 
market share in the third market may imply a reallocation of labour-intensive 
or low technology products to China to take advantage of low labour costs 
and not necessarily mean a loss of competitiveness. Correlation analysis has 
its caveat too. The analysis would definitely show positive correlations if 
product classification in aggregate data for empirical studies is too broadly 
defined. Secondly, both types of analyses have not taken into account the 
investment and trade patterns in the region which may throw some light on 
the integrated patterns in the whole range of supply chains within the Asian 
region. Such Asian production networks are becoming more pervasive in the 
region where logistic management and management controls through 
advances in computer and telecommunication technology facilitate the 
exploitation of comparative advantage of each country by MNCs. 
 
Window of Opportunities for Southeast Asia 
 
China provides ample opportunities for Southeast Asia in two respects. 
With its huge size of domestic market and cheap labour costs, China 
represents an attractive investment destination, especially with its attractive 
preferential tax treatment for foreign investors. In fact, ethnic Chinese 
businesses from Southeast Asia were one of the pioneer investors investing 
in China when China opened its door in 1978. One of the main reasons for 
investing in China was due invariably to affirmative actions undertaken by 
some of the Southeast Asian governments with racial discrimination that 
forces these ethnic Chinese enterprises to invest abroad (Ng, 1998). China, 
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with its open door policy, large domestic market and cheap labour represents 
vast investment opportunities for these ethnic businesses to evade domestic 
discrimination. On the other hand, their close cultural affinity and low 
language barriers with mainland China have enhanced their competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis that of business corporations from other parts of the world 
(Ng, 2006). To China, these overseas Chinese capitalists were, in fact, its 
target in attracting FDI during the Experimental Period (1979-83). When the 
Asian Financial Crisis broke out China again represented a more viable 
investment destination as compared with that of other Asian region which was 
infected with political and economic uncertainty then.  
 
Among the Southeast countries, Singapore seems to benefit the most 
with the rise of China. Unlike other countries in the region, the Singapore 
government took the initiative in promoting Singaporean investment into 
China, as part of its regionalization drive in 1993. With its “political 
entrepreneurship” and reputation in “honesty and straightforwardness” in 
business dealings (Bolt, 2000), the Singapore government through its 
government-linked corporation (GLCs) has set up the Suzhou Industrial Park 
(SIP) in Jiangsu Province with co-operation from the Chinese counterpart. As 
a result, Singapore is one of the leading investors in China, indeed. 
 
With the on-going liberalization in China’s services sectors, following its 
commitments under the WTO accession, Southeast Asia would benefit from 
such liberalization. Under WTO rules, China will have to fully open all of its 
markets to foreign service providers in a number of key services areas over a 
span of  five years, from 2002 to 2007 (Whalley, 2003). Such areas include 
distribution, financial services, telecommunications, professional business and 
computer services, motion pictures, environmental services, accounting, law, 
architecture, construction, and travel and tourism. China is also planning to 
liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership and geographical coverage of 
licenses in the services sector. Such liberalization represents ample 
opportunities for ethnic Chinese businesses in the region to exploit through 
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direct investment. Of significance is the recent strategic move by Temasek 
Holdings of Singapore to serves as a strategic investor in the reform of four 
state-owned banks. Temasek has invested US$3.1 billion or 3.1% of share 
capital in Bank of China and US$1.4 billion or 5.1% of share capital of China 
Construction Bank. 
 
Apart from investment opportunities in China, China is now one of the 
largest global investors in the world and that role alone will represent another 
opportunity for Southeast Asian countries to attract Chinese investment in the 
region (Wong and Chan, 2003; Frost, 2004). According to data from China’s 
Ministry of Commerce, as at end of 2003, there were 7,470 Chinese 
enterprises investing overseas, as compared with 1,882 in 1995. Out of the 
total number of these enterprises, a disproportionately large number of these 
enterprises were located in Hong Kong (2,336 companies), most of which 
were suspected to be for “round-tripping” purpose. Central and Eastern 
Europe (865) ranked second while ASEAN countries ranked third (857 
companies). In terms of cumulative value of Chinese investment over the 
period 1979-2001, most of these investments were directed to European 
Union (15.3%), ASEAN (13.2%), the United States (12.6%), and Hong Kong 
(12%). 
 
Chinese investments in the developed countries such as European 
Union and the United States were largely meant for acquiring latest 
technology, managerial know-how, international brand names and distribution 
networks (Lunding, 2006). The motives of Chinese investment in the ASEAN 
region differ from country to country. Chinese investment in low- income 
ASEAN countries (Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) concentrated on 
infrastructure development and manufacturing activities, especially in textiles, 
garment industries, home appliances, and consumer electronics. This is 
because these industries were facing severe competition at home in China, 
resulting in thinning of profit margins and overcapacity in domestic production. 
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Chinese investment in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are more for 
resource seeking types, especially in petroleum and commodities sector.  
 
In the case of investment in Singapore by Chinese companies, the 
main motive is to make use of Singapore’s well-established network in 
regional markets for Chinese enterprises sourcing for raw materials and 
intermediate goods in Southeast Asia (Wu and Yeo, 2002). Singapore can 
serve these same Chinese enterprises a regional marketing and distribution 
base in the ASEAN region. Moreover, Chinese companies are also able to 
exploit Singapore’s comparative advantage in the provision of managerial 
talent, brand building expertise, legal and human resources services to 
globalize their operations. In particular, Singapore with its strategic location 
can serve as a bridge between China and India, as well as between China 
and Middle East countries. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
China with its huge size and rapid economic growth since 1979 is both 
a competitor and comrade to the Southeast Asian region. It is a competitor to 
the Southeast Asian countries especially in the third country markets such as 
the United States and European Union because of its low labour costs and 
abundant supply of quality labour. It is also a competitor to Southeast Asia in 
attracting FDI. Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam are 
not lack of cheap labour but the quality of labour and investment climate have 
yet to be improved so as to be more competitive vis-à-vis that of China.  
 
However, China also provides ample opportunities for Southeast Asia 
to be a partner in economic growth. Firstly, Southeast Asia is richly endowed 
with natural resources while China is lacking. With its rapid economic growth, 
China’s demand for natural resources especially energy has been on the rise 
and in this respect, Southeast Asia plays a complementary role to the 
economic development of China. 
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In the manufacturing sector, Southeast Asia is already integrated in the 
Asian production networks in which China plays a pivotal role. This is 
evidenced by the increasing “triangular trade” among the developed countries, 
China and other Asian countries. Intra-firm and intra-industry trades in the 
East Asian region are pervasive and have shown signs of strengthening and 
becoming much embedded. With its huge economy, China presents 
opportunities for investment especially those market seeking types of MNCs 
in the region. Singapore and Malaysia took the lead in this investment drives 
in China since early 1990s especially in light manufacturing, real estate and 
hotel industry. In fact, some economists argue that the economic rise of China 
has well placed itself in a “flying geese” pattern of economic development in 
East Asia. With the turn of the new century, China, with its huge foreign 
exchange reserves is actively investing abroad. Southeast Asia countries 
such as Singapore, Thailand, and Laos also benefit somewhat from this 
investment flows. Moreover, Southeast Asian countries, through their 
respective ethnic groups such as Indian, Muslim and western-educated 
communities can also play the middleman role between China and the West, 
between China and India as well as between China and the Middle East. Al in 
all, China has replaced Japan as a new engine of economic growth in the 
East Asian region including Southeast Asia since early 1990s when Japan 
entered a period of “Lost Decade”. 
 
A cursory survey of literature in this area has shown mixed results. To 
some, China is a competitor especially when it also moves upward in the 
technological ladder. To others, China’s emergence has given rise to 
opportunities whereby Southeast Asia, with is its proximity and cultural affinity 
through its ethnic Chinese population is able to exploit for its own economic 
gains. At this juncture, there is no clear sign as to which argument is more 
appropriate. The following parable quoted by Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and 
Schindler (2003) best described the current situation: 
 
“Two men sought a Buddhist monk’s help to resolve their 
dispute. The first man told his side of the story, and the monk 
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said: ‘You’re right!’ The second gave his side, and the monk 
said: ‘You’re right!’ A third person who was listening to all this 
protested to the monk: ‘These men have opposing views. How 
can you say they’re right?’ The monk thought for a bit and told 
him: ‘You’re right too’.”  
 
From the perspective of the Buddhist monk in the parable above, the 
two opposing views are not at all conflicting. It all depends on which 
perspective you are looking at. Even then, Southeast Asia will still face 
challenges from China in the future. The most immediate task ahead is how to 
avert direct competition from China and also how to move up the 
technological ladder and yet complementing to the Chinese economy. The 
worst scenario is to revert back to a primary commodities producing region as 
in the 1950s and 1960s. While complementing to the Chinese economic 
growth, the long term prospect as a primary commodities producing region is 
not a welcome scenario. 
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